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1 ABSTRACT
Volumetric attacks, which overwhelm the bandwidth of a destina-
tion, are among the most common DDoS attacks today. Despite
considerable effort made by both research and industry, our recent
interviews with over 100 potential DDoS victims in over 10 industry
segments indicate that today’s DDoS prevention is far from perfect.
On one hand, few academical proposals have ever been deployed in
the Internet; on the other hand, solutions offered by existing DDoS
prevention vendors are not silver bullet to defend against the entire
attack spectrum. Guided by such large-scale study of today’s DDoS
defense, in this paper, we present MiddlePolice, the first readily
deployable and proactive DDoS prevention mechanism.We carefully
architect MiddlePolice such that it requires no changes from both
the Internet core and the network stack of clients, yielding instant
deployability in the current Internet architecture. Further, relying
on our novel capability feedback mechanism, MiddlePolice is able
to enforce destination-driven traffic control so that it guarantees to
deliver victim-desired traffic regardless of the attacker strategies.
We implement a prototype of MiddlePolice, and demonstrate its fea-
sibility via extensive evaluations in the Internet, hardware testbed
and large-scale simulations.
2 INTRODUCTION
Because the Internet internally does not enforce any traffic con-
trol requirements, a number of attacks have been developed to
overwhelm Internet end systems. The most significant of these
attacks is the volumetric Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) at-
tack, representing over 65% of all DDoS attacks in 2015 [46]. In a
volumetric DDoS, many attackers coordinate and send high-rate
traffic to a victim, in an attempt to overwhelm the bottleneck links
close to the victim. Typical Internet links use RED and drop-tail
FIFO queuing disciplines, which provide nearly-equal loss rates to
all traffic. Consequently, saturated links impose equal loss rates
on attacking and legitimate traffic alike. While legitimate traffic
∗The initial work is published in ACM CCS 2016, titled MiddlePolice: Toward Enforcing
Destination-Defined Policies in the Middle of the Internet [39].
tends to back off to avoid further congestion, attack traffic does
not back off, so links saturated by a DDoS attack are effectively
closed to legitimate traffic. Recent DDoS attacks include a 620 Gbps
attack against Krebs’ security blog [31] and a 1 Tbps attack against
OVH [30], a French ISP.
Over the past few decades, both the industry and research have
made considerable effort to address this problem. Academics pro-
posed various approaches, ranging fromfiltering-based approaches [12,
26, 37, 41, 49, 51], capability-based approaches [38, 39, 55, 56],
overlay-based systems [8, 18, 28], systems based on future Internet
architectures [9, 44, 57] and other approaches [22, 42, 54]. Mean-
while, many cloud security service providers (e.g., Akamai, Cloud-
flare) have played an important role in practical DDoS prevention.
These providers massively over-provision data centers for peak
attack traffic loads and then share this capacity across many cus-
tomers as needed. When under DDoS attack, victims use DNS or
BGP to redirect their traffic to the provider rather than their own
networks. These providers apply their proprietary techniques to
scrub traffic, separating malicious from benign, and then re-inject
the remaining traffic back into the network of their customers.
Although these academic and industrial solutions have been
proposed for years, the research literature offers surprisingly few
real-world studies about their performance and the current status
of DDoS prevention. Thus, supported by the NSF I-Corps program,
we initiated a large-scale interview with over 100 potential DDoS
victims spread across more than ten industry segments to under-
stand (i) their opinions about academic proposals, (ii) their current
practice for DDoS prevention and (iii) their opinions about these
common practices. Our study highlights multiple key observations,
two of which are the indeployability of most academic proposals
and the “band-aid” nature of the scrubbing services offered by these
cloud security service providers.
Our study clearly establishes that any advancedDDoS prevention
system must meet the following two key challenges.
(i) Instant Deployability. Any practical DDoS prevention proposal
must be readily deployable in the current Internet architecture. This
is challenging because the current Internet contains over 60,000
independent Autonomous Systems (ASes), with varying levels of
technological sophistication and cooperativeness. As a result, prior
academic approaches (e.g., SIFF [55], TVA [56], and NetFence [38])
that require secret key management and router upgrades across
a large number of ASes face significant deployment hurdles. To
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address this challenge, we carefully architect our propose system
MiddlePolice such that it requires no changes from both the Internet
core and network stack of clients, yielding instant deployability.
(ii) Proactive Defense. As we shall see, the filtering services offered
by existing Cloud Security Service Providers (CSSPs) are not a silver
bullet as the majority of potential DDoS victims that purchase ser-
vices from CSSPs still experience problems. The fact that even these
CSSPs with decades of DDoS mitigation experience cannot develop
perfect filtering techniques probably indicates that it is difficult
to win the arms race with attackers simply via reactive filtering.
Thus, we argue that an advanced DDoS mitigation should focus
on delivering victim-desired traffic even without understanding
characteristics of attacks. To this end, MiddlePolice is designed to
enforce destination-driven traffic control for DDoS mitigation so
as to minimize any possible disruption caused by the attacks.
To summarize, our key contributions are:
• A study of today’s DDoS defense involving over 100 potential
DDoS victims in more than 10 industry segments.
• A systematic analysis of our findings to clarify the design
space of advanced DDoS prevention mechanisms.
• The design, implementation and evaluation of MiddlePolice,
the first system offering readily deployable and proactive
DDoS mitigation.
3 DDOS DEFENSE TODAY
Before discussing our proposed system, we first present our study
of current status of real-world DDoS attacks and defense. Supported
by the NSF Innovation Corps program under grant IIP-1758179, we
interviewed more than 100 security engineers/administrators from
over ten industrial segments, including hosting companies, finan-
cial departments, online gaming providers, military contractors,
government institutes, medical foundations, and existing DDoS
prevention vendors. To the best of our knowledge, in the research
community, this is the first comprehensive study of DDoS preven-
tion from the perspective of security experts that are the first-line
DDoS defenders. Our analysis highlights following key observa-
tions.
3.1 Deployment of Academic Proposals
Over the past decades, the research community have proposed
various approaches, see discussion in § 11. From the research per-
spective, most of these proposals are provably secure and ensure
that a DDoS victim can suppress unwanted traffic. Unfortunately,
over the past decades, few research proposals have ever been de-
ployed in the Internet.
Such lack of real-world deployment is because potential DDoS
victims (even large ones such as international financial departments)
are unable to enforce the deployment of academic proposals in the
Internet. For instance, some proposals require software/hardware
upgrades from a large number of geographically distributed ASes.
However, due to the lack of business relationship with these remote
ASes, these victims are incapable of enforcing any deployment
within these ASes. Among all our interviews with security adminis-
trators, few of them mentioned that they would consider academic
proposals for their practical DDoS prevention.
3.2 The Market Giants
In practice, potential DDoS victims rely onDDoS prevention providers
to keep them online. In our study, we interviewed ten market gi-
ants in this space, including cloud security-service providers that
build massively-provisioned data centers to scrub attack traffic and
vendors that sell on-premise hardware equipments designed for
DDoS prevention. We make the following key observations.
3.2.1 Cloud Security-Service Providers
Cloud Security-Service Providers (CSSPs) play an important role
for DDoS prevention: over 80 percent of our interviewed potential
DDoS victims purchase services from CSSPs. Although their actual
products could differ, these CSSPs typically work as follows: de-
ploying geographically distributed automatic systems (referred to
as sites), terminating customer traffic at these sites, filtering traffic
using proprietary rules, and reinjecting the scrubbed traffic back
to their customers. CSSPs indeed offer invaluable services to their
customers. However, their defense is not a silver bullet. In particular,
two caveats are worth mentioning. First, connection termination
at CSSPs’ sites is privacy invasive for some large organizations,
such as government institutes and medical foundations. Second,
their “secret sauce” filtering technique typically deals with large-
yet-obvious attacks (i.e., although traffic volumes are huge, these
attacks are “trivial” to distinguish via static filters, such as port
filtering). Quoting one administrator:
I believe automatic systems managed by vendors should only
deal with large things (attacks). Getting into discussion of
customer-specific filtering is a slippery slope.
In §3.3, we discuss how these caveats might affect DDoS victims
that use protection services from CSSPs.
3.2.2 On-premise DDoS Prevention Hardware
Another type of vendor in DDoS prevention space is hardware man-
ufacturers. Unlike CSSPs that build massive infrastructure, these
vendors offer specialized hardware with built-in DDoS prevention
capability, such as configurable filtering rules, traffic monitoring
and advanced queuing. About 45% of our interviewed potential
DDoS targets deploy on-premise hardware.
3.3 Potential DDoS Victims
We interviewed security engineers/administrators from potential
DDoS victims that are fairly large organizations whose online pres-
ence is critical for their business. Examples include web hosting
companies, online content providers, financial departments, med-
ical foundations, government facilities and so on. We summarize
our findings as follows.
3.3.1 Mixed Opinions Towards CSSPs
Over 80% of all interviewed potential DDoS victims purchase scrub-
bing services from one of these CSSPs. Their opinions towards these
services are mixed. Some security administrators said that these
providers do a “decent” job to prevent attacks. However, the major-
ity of interviewed administrators claim that they experience attacks
even after purchasing these services. Although these attacks are
not large enough to knock them offline completely, they still result
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in various performance issues, including system instability, severe
packet losses and even customer churn. Quoting one administrator:
We do understand their (CSSPs) filters are a band-aid. But these
are common practice.
This observation echoes our discussion in §3.2.1. Since CSSPs
mainly focus on dealing with large-yet-obvious attacks, any at-
tack traffic that bypasses their filters will eventually reach end-
customers. Although these attacks are “small” by a CSSP’s defi-
nition, they are large enough to cause problems for those DDoS
targets.
3.3.2 On-Demand Filtering From ISPs
About 20% of our interviewed victims (such as medical and gov-
erment institutes) do not rely on CSSPs. The primary reason is
privacy concerns: they cannot afford to allow a third party to have
full access to their network connections. As a result, they typically
deploy on-premise devices to closely monitor network traffic, and
once the traffic volume is above a pre-defined threshold, they work
together with their ISPs to filter these offending flows.
3.4 Survey Summary
To recap, our survey covers over 100 potential DDoS victims inmore
than ten industry segments. The key observations are summarized
as follows. (i) Since most of the academic proposals incur significant
deployment overhead in the Internet, few of them have ever been
deployed in the Internet. (ii) Current CSSPs that dominate the
marketmainly care about scrubbing large-yet-obvious attacks based
on empirical filtering rules. (iii) Some potential DDoS victims are
attacked continuously even if they purchase services from CSSPs.
(iv) Some potential victims that cannot afford to allow CSSPs to
terminate their network connections due to privacy concerns have
to rely on their ISPs to block offending flows.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
4.1 Design Space and Goals
Having understood the status of real-world DDoS defense, when
designing MiddlePolice, we explicitly achieve two primary goals:
being readily deployable in the current Internet and offering proac-
tive mitigation even against sophisticated DDoS attacks. To achieve
instant deployability, we carefully architect MiddlePolice such that
it requires no changes from both the Internet core and the net-
work stack of clients. Further, the fact that even these large CSSPs
with decades of DDoS mitigation experience are unable to offer
satisfactory defense indicates that probably it is difficult to win
the arms race with attackers by only reactive filters. Rather, we
argue that effective DDoS mitigation, to a large extent, is about
delivering victim-desired traffic even without understanding the
characteristics of attacks. Such proactive DDoS mitigation can min-
imize any potential disruption caused by attacks, regardless of how
adversaries may adjust their strategies. In summary, to offer readily
deployable and proactive DDoS mitigation, MiddlePolice enables
the following three key properties.
Readily Deployable and Scalable. MiddlePolice is designed to
be readily deployable in the Internet and sufficiently scalable to
handle large scale attacks. To be readily deployable, a system should
only require deployment at the destination, and possibly at related
parties on commercial terms. The end-to-end principle of the In-
ternet, combined with large numbers of end points, is what gives
rise to its tremendous utility.Because of the diversity of adminis-
trative domains, including end points, edge-ASes, and small transit
ASes, ASes have varying levels of technological sophistication and
cooperativeness. However, some ASes can be expected to help
with deployment; many ISPs already provide some sort of DDoS-
protection services [4], so we can expect that such providers would
be willing to deploy a protocol under commercially reasonable
terms. We contrast this with prior capability-based work, which
requires deployment at a large number of unrelated ASes in the
Internet and client network stack modification, that violates the
deployability model.
The goal of being deployable and scalable is the pushing reason
that MiddlePolice is designed to be deployable in cloud infrastruc-
ture without changing the Internet core.
Destination-Driven Traffic Control Policies. MiddlePolice is
designed to provide the destination with fine-grained control over
the utilization of their network resources. Throughout the paper,
we use “destination” and “victim” interchangeably. Existing cloud-
based DDoS-prevention vendors have not provided such function-
ality. Many previously proposed capability-based systems are like-
wise designed to work with a single scheduling policy. For instance,
CRAFT [29] enforces per-flow fairness, Portcullis [47] and Mi-
rage [42] enforce per-compute fairness, NetFence [38] enforces
per-sender fairness, SIBRA [13] enforces per-steady-bandwidth
fairness, and SpeakUp [54] enforces per-outbound-bandwidth fair-
ness. If any of these mechanisms is ever deployed, a single policy
will be enforced, forcing the victim to accept the choice made by the
defense approach. However, no single fairness regime can satisfy
all potential victims’ requirements. Ideally, MiddlePolice should
be able to support arbitrary victim-chosen traffic control policies.
In addition to these fairness metrics, MiddlePolice can implement
ideas such as ARROW’s [48] special pass for critical traffic, and
prioritized services for premium clients.
To the best of our knowledge, MiddlePolice is the first DDoS
prevention mechanism that advocates destination-driven traffic
control for DDoS mitigation. We argue that destination-driven traf-
fic control is the key to offer proactive DDoS attacks even against
sophisticated DDoS attacks. There is a fundamental difference be-
tween destination-driven traffic control with any vendor or protocol
defined traffic control. In particular, compared with vendors or net-
work protocol designers, victim serves can have much more specific
and complete knowledge base about their own desired traffic, for in-
stance, through comprehensive trafficmonitoring and analysis. As a
result, victim servers can make more rational forwarding decisions
that are coherent with their mission and applications. Therefore,
regardless of how sophisticated a DDoS attack is, as long as Middle-
Police can effectively enforce victim-defined traffic control policies
to forward victim-preferred traffic, the impact imposed by the DDoS
attack on a victim is minimized.
Fixing the Bypass Vulnerability. Since MiddlePolice is designed
to be deployed in cloud infrastructure, we need to further address
an open vulnerability. In particular, existing cloud-based DDoS-
prevention vendors rely on DNS or BGP to redirect the destination’s
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traffic to their infrastructures. However, this model opens up the
attack of infrastructure bypass. For example, a majority of cloud-
protected web servers are subject to IP address exposure [43, 53].
Larger victims that SWIP their IP addresses may be unable to keep
their IP addresses secret from a determined adversary. In such cases,
the adversary can bypass the cloud infrastructure by routing traffic
directly to the victims. MiddlePolice includes a readily deployable
mechanism to address this vulnerability.
However, it is non-trivial to achieve the above key properties si-
multaneously. Existing research literature is replete with capability-
based systems that provide a single fairness guarantee with exten-
sive client modification and deployment at non-affiliated ASes. The
novelty and challenge of MiddlePolice is therefore architecting a
system to move deployment to the cloud while enforcing a wide
variety of destination-selectable fairness metrics. Built atop a novel
capability feedback mechanism, MiddlePolice meets the challenge,
thereby protecting against DDoS more flexibly and deployably.
4.2 Adversary Model and Assumptions
Adversary Model.We consider a strong adversary owning large
botnets that can launch strategic attacks and amplify its attack [32].
We assume the adversary is not on-path between anymbox and the
victim, since otherwise it could drop all packets. Selecting routes
without on-path adversaries is an orthogonal problem and is the
subject of active research in next-generation Internet protocols (e.g.,
SCION [57]).
Well-connected mboxes. MiddlePolice is built on a distributed
and replicable set of mboxes that are well-connected to the Internet
backbone. We assume the Internet backbone has sufficient capacity
and path redundancy to absorb large volumes of traffic, and DDoS
attacks against the set of all mboxes can never be successful. This
assumption is a standard assumption for cloud-based systems.
Victim Cooperation.MiddlePolice’s defense requires the victim’s
cooperation. If the victim can hide its IP addresses from attackers, it
simply needs to remove a MiddlePolice-generated capability carried
in each packet and return it back to the mboxes. The victim needs
not to modify its layer-7 applications as the capability feedback
mechanism is transparent to applications. If attackers can directly
send or point traffic (e.g., through reflection attacks) to the victim,
the victim needs to block the bypassing traffic. MiddlePolice in-
cludes a packet filtering mechanism that is readily deployable on
commodity Internet routers with negligible overhead.
Cross-traffic Management.We assume that bottlenecks on the
path from an mbox to the victim that is shared with other desti-
nations are properly managed, such that cross-traffic targeted at
another destination cannot cause unbounded losses of the victim’s
traffic. Generally, per-destination-AS traffic shaping (e.g., weighted
fair share) on these links will meet this requirement.
5 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
MiddlePolice’s high-level architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. A
MiddlePolice-protected victim redirects its traffic to the mboxes.
Each mbox polices traversing traffic to enforce the traffic control
policy chosen by the victim. The traffic policing relies on a feed-
back loop of MiddlePolice-generated capabilities to eliminate the
The Internet 
Backbone
Cloud Cloud
The Victim
ISP ISP
The mbox Packet Filtering
Figure 1: The architecture of MiddlePolice. The mboxes po-
lice traffic to enforce victim-selected traffic control policies.
The packet filtering can discard nearly all traffic bypassing
the upstreammboxes.
deployment requirements on downstream paths. When the victim
keeps its IP addresses secret, a single deploying mbox can secure
the entire downstream path from the mbox to the victim.
For victims whose IP addresses are exposed, attackers can bypass
the mboxes and direct attack traffic to the victim. The same vulner-
ability applies for current existing cloud-based DDoS-prevention
systems. To address this problem, MiddlePolice designs a packet
filtering mechanism relying on the ACL on commodity routers or
switches to eliminate the traffic that does not traverse any mbox.
As long as each bottleneck link is protected by an upstream filter,
the bypass attack can be prevented.
6 DETAILED DESIGN OFMBOXES
MiddlePolice’s traffic policing algorithm (i) probes the available
downstream bandwidth from each mbox to the victim and (ii) allo-
cates the bandwidth to senders to enforce the traffic control policies
chosen by the victim.
BandwidthProbe.The fundamental challenge of estimating down-
stream bandwidth is that MiddlePolice requires no deployment at
downstream links. Such a challenge is two-sided: an overestimate
will cause downstream flooding, rendering traffic policing useless,
while an underestimate will waste downstream capacity, affecting
networking performance.
To solve the overestimation problem, MiddlePolice relies on a ca-
pability feedback mechanism to make senders self-report howmany
packets they have successfully delivered to the victim. Specifically,
upon a packet arrival, the mbox stamps an unforgeable capability
in the packet. When the packet is delivered to the victim, Middle-
Police’s capability handling module (CHM) deployed on the victim
returns the carried capability back to the mbox. If the capability
is not returned to the mbox after a sufficiently long time interval
(compared with the RTT between the mbox and victim), the mbox
will consider the packet lost. Thus, the feedback enables thembox to
infer a packet loss rate (hereinafter, LLR) for each sender. Then the
mbox estimates the downstream capacity as the difference between
the number of packets received from all senders and packets lost on
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Table 1: Fields of an iTable entry and their sizes (bits).
f TA Pid NR ND WR WV LR
64 32 16 32 32 32 128 64
the downstream path. As the estimation is based on the traffic vol-
ume delivered to the victim, this approach solves the overestimation
problem.
However, the above technique does not overcome the underesti-
mation problem. Specifically, since the traffic demand may be less
than downstream capacity, simply using the volume of delivered
traffic may cause underestimation. To prevent underestimation, the
mbox categorizes packets from each sender as privileged packets
and best-effort packets. Specifically, the mbox maintains a rate win-
dowWR for each sender to determine the amount of privileged
packets allowed for the sender in each period (hereinafter, detection
period).WR is computed based on the above downstream capacity
estimation as well as victim-chosen policies. Packets sent beyond
WR are classified as best-effort packets. The mbox forwards all
privileged packets to the victim, whereas the forwarding decisions
for best-effort packets are subject to a short-term packet loss rate
(hereinafter, SLR). The SLR reflects downstream packet loss rates
(congestion) at a RTT granularity. That is, if the downstream is
not congested upon an arrival of a best-effort packet, the mbox
will forward the packet. Thus, even when the downstream capacity
(and thusWR ) is underestimated, thembox can still further deliver
packets as long as the downstream path is not congested.
Fairness Regimes. Each mbox allocates its bandwidth estimate
amongst its senders based on the sharing policies chosen by the
victim. For policies enforcing global fairness among all senders, all
mboxes sharing the same bottleneck share their local observations.
We consider co-bottleneck detection in § 10.3.
6.1 Information Table
The basis of MiddlePolice’s traffic policing is an information table
(iTable) maintained by each mbox. Each row of the iTable corre-
sponds to a single sender. The contents of the iTable (and therefore
its complexity and cost of maintaining the table) depend on the
victim-selected traffic control policy; this section describes iTable
elements needed for enforcing per-sender fairness, and § 6.3.5 ex-
tends the iTable to other traffic control policies. In § 8, we describe
multiple mechanisms to filter source spoofing at the mbox, so this
section ignores source spoofing.
Each sender si has one row in the iTable, identified by a unique
identifier f . The table contents are illustrated in Table 1. Other than
f , the remaining fields are updated in each detection period. The
timestamp TA records the current detection period. The capability
ID Pid is the maximum number of distinct capabilities generated
for si . NR stores the number of packets received from si . ND indi-
cates the number of best-effort packets dropped by the mbox.WR
determines the maximum number of privileged packets allowed for
si . The verification windowWV is designed to compute si ’s packet
loss rate, whereas LR stores the LLR for si .
Table 2: System parameters.
Symb. Definition Value
Dp The length of the detection period 4s
Thcap The upper bound of capability ID 128
Thrtt Maximum waiting time for cap. feedback 1s
Thdropslr SLR thres. for dropping best-effort pkts 0.05
β The weight of historical loss rates 0.8
Thlpass The threshold for calculating LLR 5
Sslr The length limit of the cTable 100
6.2 Capability Computation
For si , thembox generates two types of capabilities: distinct capabil-
ities and common capabilities. The CHM can use either capability
to authenticate that the packet has traversed thembox, though only
distinct capabilities are used to infer downstream packet losses.
A distinct capability for si is computed as follows:
C = IPMP | | ts | | Pid | | f | | TA | |
MACKs (IPMP | | ts | | Pid | | f | | TA),
(1)
where IPMP is the IP address of the mbox issuing C and ts is the
current timestamp (included to mitigate replay attack). The com-
bination of Pid | | f | |TA ensures the uniqueness of C. The MAC is
computed based on a secret key Ks shared by allmboxes. The MAC
is 128 bits, so the entire C consumes∼300 bits. A common capability
is defined as follows
Cc = IPMP | | ts | | MACKs (IPMP | | ts). (2)
The design of capability incorporates a MAC to ensure that
attackers without secure keys cannot generate valid capabilities,
preventing capability abuse.
6.3 Traffic Policing Logic
6.3.1 Populating the iTable
We first describe how to populate the iTable. At time ts, the mbox
receives the first packet from si . It creates an entry for si , with f
computed based on si ’s source address, and initializes the remaining
fields to zero. It then updates TA to ts , increases both NR and Pid
by one to reflect the packet arrival and computes a capability using
the updated Pid and TA.
New packet arrival from source si may trigger the mbox to start
new detection period for si . In particular, upon receiving a packet
from si with arrival time ta−TA > Dp (Dp is the length of the
detection period), the mbox starts a new detection period for si
by setting TA = ta . The mbox also updates the remaining fields
based on the traffic policing algorithm (as described in § 6.3.4). The
algorithm depends on si ’s LLR and thembox’s SLR, the computation
of which is described in the following two sections.
6.3.2 Inferring the LLR for Source si
Capability Generation. For each packet from si , the mbox gen-
erates a distinct capability for the packet if (i) its arrival time
ta − TA < Dp − Thrtt, and (ii) the capability ID Pid < Thcap. The
first constraint ensures that the mbox allows at least Thrtt for each
5
capability to be returned from the CHM. By setting Thrtt well above
the RTT from the mbox to the victim, any missing capabilities at
the end of the current detection period correspond to lost packets.
Table 2 lists the system parameters including Thrtt and their sug-
gested values. MiddlePolice’s performance with different parameter
settings is studied and analyzed in § 10.3. The second constraint
Thcap bounds the number of distinct capabilities issued for si in one
detection period, and thus bounds the memory requirement. We
set Thcap = 128 to reduce the LLR sampling error while keeping
memory overhead low.
Packets violating either of the two constraints, if any, will carry
a common capability (Equation (2)), which is not returned by the
CHM or used to learn si ’s LLR. However, it can be used as an
authenticator that the packet has been accepted by one of the
upstream mboxes.
Capability Feedback Verification. Let Kth denote the number
of distinct capabilities the mbox generates for si , with capability
ID ranging from [1,Kth]. Each time the mbox receives a returned
capability, it checks the capability ID to determine which packet
(carrying the received capability) has been received by the CHM.
WV represents a windowwith Thcap bits. Initially all the bits are set
to zero. When a capability with capability ID i is received, thembox
sets the ith bit inWV to one. At the end of the current detection
period, the zero bits in the first Kth bits ofWV indicate the losses
of the corresponding packets. To avoid feedback reuse, the mbox
only accepts feedback issued in the current period.
LLR Computation. LLR in the kth detection period is computed
at the end of the period, i.e., the time when the mbox starts a new
detection period for si . si ’s lost packets may contain downstream
losses and best-effort packets dropped by the mbox (ND ). The
number of packets that si sent to downstream links is NR − ND ,
and the downstream packet loss rate is V0Pid , whereV0 is the number
of zero bits in the first Pid bits ofWV . Thus, the estimated number
of downstream packet losses is Ndstreamloss = (NR − ND )
V0
Pid . Then
we have LLR = (Ndstreamloss +ND )/NR .
Our strawman design is subject to statistical bias, and may have
negative effects on TCP timeouts. In particular, assume one legit-
imate TCP source recovers from a timeout and sends one packet
to probe the network condition. If the packet is dropped again, the
source will enter a longer timeout. However, with the strawman
design, the source would incorrectly have a 100% loss rate. Adding
a low-pass filter can fix this problem: if si ’s NR in the current pe-
riod is less than a small threshold Thlpass, the mbox sets its LLR
in the current period to zero. Attackers may exploit this design
using on-off attacks [33]. In § 6.3.4, we explain how to handle such
attacks. Formally, we write LLR as follows
LLR =
0, if NR < ThlpassNdstreamloss +NDNR , otherwise (3)
6.3.3 Inferring the SLR
SLR is designed to reflect downstream congestion on a per-RTT
basis (i.e., almost realtime downstream congestion), and is computed
across all flows from thembox to the victim. Like LLR, SLR is learned
through capabilities returned by the CHM. Specifically, the mbox
maintains a hash table (cTable) to record capabilities used to learn
its SLR. The hash key is the capability itself and the value is a single
bit value (initialized to zero) to indicate whether the corresponding
key (capability) has been returned.
As described in § 6.3.2, when a packet arrives (from any source),
the mbox stamps a capability on the packet. The capability will
be added into cTable if it is not a common capability and cTable’s
length has not reached the predefined threshold Sslr. The mbox
maintains a timestamp Tslr when the last capability is added into
cTable. Then, it uses the entire batch of capabilities in the cTable to
learn the SLR. We set Sslr = 100 to allow fast capability loading to
the cTable (and therefore fast downstream congestion detection),
while minimizing sampling error from Sslr being too small.
The mbox allows at most Thrtt from Tslr to receive feedback for
all capabilities in the cTable. Some capabilities may be returned
before Tslr (i.e., before the cTable fills). Once a capability in cTable
is returned, the mbox marks it as received. Upon receiving a new
packet with arrival time ta > Tslr + Thrtt, the mbox computes
SLR = Z0Sslr , where Z0 is the number of cTable entries that are not
received. The mbox then resets the current cTable to be empty to
start a new monitoring cycle for SLR.
6.3.4 Traffic Policing Algorithm
We now detail the traffic policing algorithm to enforce victim-
selected traffic control policies. We formalize the traffic policing
logic in Algorithm 1. Upon receiving a packet P , thembox retrieves
the entry F in iTable matching P (line 8). If no entry matches, the
mbox initializes an entry for P .
P is categorized as a privileged or best-effort packet based on
F ’sWR (line 10). All privileged packets are accepted, whereas best-
effort packets are accepted conditionally. If P is privileged, thembox
performs necessary capability handling (line 11) before appending
P to the privileged queue. The mbox maintains two FIFO queues to
serve all accepted packets: the privileged queue serving privileged
packets and the best-effort queue serving best-effort packets. The
privileged queue has strictly higher priority than the best-effort
queue at the output port. CapabilityHandling (line 16) executes the
capability generation and cTable updates (line 37), as detailed in
§ 6.3.2 and § 6.3.3, respectively.
If P is a best-effort packet, its forwarding decision is subject to
the mbox’s SLR and F ′s LLR (line 24). If the SLR exceeds Thdropslr ,
indicating downstream congestion, the mbox discards P . Further,
if F ’s LLR is already above Thdropslr , the mbox will not deliver best-
effort traffic for F as well since F already experiences severe losses.
Thdropslr is set to be few times larger than a TCP flow’s loss rate in
normal network condition [52] to absorb burst losses. If the mbox
decides to accept P , it performs capability handling (line 27).
Finally, if P ’s arrival triggers a new detection period for F
(line 15), the mbox performs corresponding updates for F (line 31).
To determine F ’s LLR, the mbox incorporates both the recent LLR
(recentLoss) obtained in the current detection period based on Equa-
tion (3) and F ’s historical loss rate LR . This design prevents attack-
ers from hiding their previous packet losses via on-off attacks. F ’s
WR is updated based on the victim-selected traffic control policy
(line 35), as described below.
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Algorithm 1: Traffic Policing Algorithm.
1 Input:
2 Packet P arrived at time ts;
3 Output:
4 iTable updates and possible cTable updates;
5 The forwarding decision of P ;
6 Main Procedure:
7 begin
8 F ← iTableEntryRetrieval(P );
9 F.NR ← F.NR + 1;
10 if F.NR < F.WR then
/* Privileged packets */
11 CapabilityHandling(P , F);
12 Append P to the privileged queue;
13 else
/* Best-effort packets */
14 BestEffortHandling(P , F);
/* Starting a new detection period if necessary */
15 if ts − F.TA > Dp then iTableHandling(F);
16 Function: CapabilityHandling(P , F):
17 begin
/* Two constraints for distinct-capability generation */
18 if F.Pid < Thcap and ts−F.TA < Dp−Thrtt then
19 F.Pid ← F.Pid + 1;
20 Generate capability C based on Equation (1);
21 cTableHandling(C);
22 else
/* Common capability for packet authentication */
23 Generate capability Cc based on Equation (2);
24 Function: BestEffortHandling(P , F):
25 begin
26 if SLR < Thdropslr and F.LR < Th
drop
slr then
27 CapabilityHandling(P , F);
28 Append P to the best-effort queue;
29 else
30 Drop P ; F.ND ← F.ND + 1;
31 Function: iTableHandling(F):
32 begin
33 Compute recentLoss based on Equation (3);
/* Consider the historical loss rate */
34 F.LR ← (1 − β ) · recentLoss + β · F.LR ;
35 WR ← BandwidthAllocationPolicy(F);
36 Reset WV , Pid, NR and ND to zero;
37 Function: cTableHandling(C):
38 begin
/* One batch of cTable is not ready */
39 if cTable.length < Sslr then
40 Add C into cTable;
41 if cTable.length == Sslr then Tslr ← ts ;
6.3.5 Traffic Control Policies
We list the following representative bandwidth allocation algo-
rithms that may be implemented in the BandwidthAllocationPolicy
module to enforce victim-chosen traffic control policies. We clarify
that this list is neither complete nor the “best”. Instead, these traffic
control policies are typical policies used by prior academic papers.
Coming up with industry-driven traffic control policies is not the
focus of this paper. In fact, our group is conducting active research
in this area.
NaturalShare: for each sender, the mbox sets its WR for the
next period to the number of delivered packets from the sender
in the current period. The design rationale for this policy is that
the mbox allows a rate that the sender can sustainably transmit
without experiencing a large LLR.
PerSenderFairshare allows the victim to enforce per-sender fair
share at bottlenecks. Each mbox fairly allocates its estimated total
downstream bandwidth to the senders that reach the victim through
the mbox. To this end, the mbox maintains the total downstream
bandwidth estimate N totalsize , which it allocates equally among all
senders. To ensure global fairness among all senders, two mboxes
sharing the same bottleneck (i.e., the two paths connecting the two
mboxeswith the victim both traverse the bottleneck link) share their
local observations. We design a co-bottleneck detection mechanism
using SLR correlation: if twomboxes’ observed SLRs are correlated,
they share a bottleneck with high probability. In § 10.3, we evaluate
the effectiveness of this mechanism.
PerASFairshare is similar to PerSenderFairshare except that the
mbox fairly allocates N totalsize on a per-AS basis. This policy mimics
SIBRA [13], preventing bot-infested ASes from taking bandwidth
away from legitimate ASes.
PerASPerSenderFairshare is a hierarchical fairness regime: the
mbox first allocatesN totalsize on a per-AS basis, and then fairly assigns
the share obtained by each AS among the senders of the AS.
PremiumClientSupport enables the victim to provide premium
service to its premium clients, such as bandwidth reservation for
upgraded ASes. The victim pre-identifies its premium clients to
MiddlePolice. PremiumClientSupport can be implemented together
with the aforementioned allocation algorithms.
7 PACKET FILTERING
When the victim’s IP addresses are kept secret, attackers cannot
bypass MiddlePolice’s upstream mboxes to route attack traffic di-
rectly to the victim. In this case, the downstream packet filtering is
unnecessary since MiddlePolice can throttle attacks at the upstream
mboxes. However, in case of IP address exposure [43, 53], the victim
needs to deploy a packet filter to discard bypassing traffic. Middle-
Police designs a filtering mechanism that extends to commodity
routers the port-based filtering of previous work [21, 22]. Unlike
prior work, the filtering can be deployed upstream of the victim as
a commercial service.
7.1 Filtering Primitives
Although the MAC-incorporated capability can prove that a packet
indeed traverses an mbox, it requires upgrades from deployed com-
modity routers to perform MAC computation to filter bypassing
packets. Thus, we invent a mechanism based on the existing ACL
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configurations on commodity routers. Specifically, each mbox en-
capsulates its traversing packets into UDP packets (similar tech-
niques have been applied in VXLAN and [25]), and uses the UDP
source and destination ports (a total of 32 bits) to carry an authen-
ticator, which is a shared secret between the mbox and the filtering
point. As a result, a 500Gbps attack (the largest attack viewed by Ar-
bor Networks [46]) that uses random port numbers will be reduced
to ∼100bps since the chance of a correct guess is 2−32. The shared
secret can be negotiated periodically based on a cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generator. We do not rely on UDP
source address for filtering to avoid source spoofing.
7.2 Packet Filtering Points
Deployed filtering points should have sufficient bandwidth so that
the bypassing attack traffic cannot cause packet losses prior to
the filtering. The filtering mechanism should be deployed at, or
upstream of, each bottleneck link caused by the DDoS attacks. For
instance, for a victim with high-bandwidth connectivity, if the bot-
tleneck link is an internal link inside the victim’s network, the
victim can deploy the filter at the inbound points of its network. If
the bottleneck link is the link connecting the victim with its ISP, the
victim can can work with its ISP, on commercially reasonable terms,
to deploy the filter deeper in the ISP’s network such that the by-
passing traffic cannot reach the victim’s network. Working with the
ISPs does not violate the deployment model in §4 as MiddlePolice
never requires deployment at unrelated ASes.
8 SOURCE AUTHENTICATION
MiddlePolice punishes senders even after an offending flow ends.
Such persistence can be built on source authentication or any mech-
anism that maintains sender accountability across flows. In this
paper, we propose the following four different source authentica-
tion mechanisms, ordered in increasing deployment requirement
but increasing robustness.
HTTPRedirection-BasedDesign.We start with a source authen-
tication that is specific to HTTP/HTTPS traffic. The mechanism
ensures that a sender is on-path to its claimed source IP address.
This source verifier is completely transparent to clients. The key
insight is that the HTTP Host header is in the first few packets of
each connection. As a result, the mbox monitors a TCP connection
and reads the Host header. If the Host header reflects a generic
(not sender-specific) hostname (e.g., victim.com), the mbox inter-
cepts this flow, and redirects the connection (HTTP 302) to a Host
containing a token cryptographically generated from the sender’s
claimed source address, e.g., T .victim.com, where T is the token.
If the sender is on-path, it will receive the redirection, and its fur-
ther connection will use the sender-specific hostname in the Host
header. When an mbox receives a request with a sender-specific
Host, it verifies that the Host is proper for the claimed IP source
address (if not, the mbox initiates a new redirection), and forwards
the request to the victim. Thus, by performing source verification
entirely at thembox, packets from spoofed sources cannot consume
any downstream bandwidth from the mbox to the victim.
If the cloud provider hosting the mbox is trusted (for instance,
large CDNs have CAs trusted by all major browsers), the victim can
share its key such that HTTPS traffic can be handled in the same
way as HTTP traffic. For untrusted cloud providers [22, 35], the
mbox should relay the encrypted connection to the victim, which
performs Host-header-related operations. The victim terminates
unverified senders without returning capabilities to the mbox, so
the additional traffic from the unverified senders is best-effort under
Algorithm 1. In this case, packets from spoofed sources consume
limited downstream bandwidth but do not rely on the trustworthi-
ness of the cloud provider.
We acknowledge that the above mechanism has few weakness.
First, it only proves that sender is on path between its claimed
IP address to the mbox. Second, if the source validation has to be
performed by the victim for HTTPS traffic, it is subject to the DoC
attack [11] in which attackers flood the victim with new connec-
tions to slow down the connection-setup for legitimate clients.
Multipath-BasedAuthentication.We can use the followingmul-
tipath based mechanism to increase the accuracy of source vali-
dation. In particular, since a cloud provider typically has many
network points of presence (PoPs), we can reduce the number of
potential on-path adversaries by distributing shares of an authenti-
cation token to various PoPs with diverse paths back to the sender.
To achieve this, MiddlePolice can use BGP routing information or
other network management tools (e.g., traceroute data) to deter-
mine a subset of all deployedmboxes with maximally diverse paths
to a particular source address. Then, the mbox initially receiving
a request is responsible for redirecting the request to the set of
pre-selected mboxes according to the source address in the request.
Thus, if the sender can receive all tokens issued by each of these
mboxes, it proves that the client is on-path for each of thesemboxes,
which, with higher probability, shows that the sender indeed owns
its claimed source address.
Source AS Assistance.With the assistance of the source AS, the
on-path attack can be bypassed entirely, ensuring that only a sender
in the source AS has access to the token. Each supporting source
AS would register an authentication proxy with MiddlePolice. To
verify that the authentication proxy is approved by the source
AS, the registration is signed using the rPKI certificates [34] that
prove control of both the IP address prefix being registered and the
associated AS number. Then, when anmbox receives a request from
an address, it first determines whether that address is represented
by an authentication proxy. If so, it establishes a key with that
authentication proxy, using the public key from the rPKI certificates.
The mbox then encrypts and provides the {client source address,
token} pair to the authentication proxy, and redirect the client to
fetch the token from its authentication proxy. Because the token is
encrypted to the authentication proxy, on-path adversaries gain no
additional information, and thus a sender can only claim a source
address only with the source AS’ approval.
Client Support via Multi-Context TLS. This source authentica-
tionmechanism, based onmcTLS [45], requires lightweight upgrade
(e.g., software installation) from clients. However, it offers at least
two advantages. First, it enables the victim to explicitly control
which portions of an encrypted connection can be read or write by
an mbox (without sharing any credentials with the cloud provider
hosting the mbox). For instance, the victim can explicitly allow the
mbox to read the HTTP Host header (carrying the token) so that the
mbox can perform source authentication directly without having to
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Figure 2: The software stack of thembox and CHM.
relay the encrypted connection to the victim any more, which ad-
dresses the second weakness of our strawman design. Second, with
such lightweight client-end upgrade, it is easier for MiddlePolice to
identify the premium clients preferred by the victim. In particular,
after a premium client successfully authenticates itself (for instance
through dedicated authentication services) to MiddlePolice that
the client is indeed a premium client for the victim, MiddlePolice
can issue the client a cryptographically signed pseudonym. For
future requests, the premium client can carry its pseudonym in a
customized HTTP header (e.g., X-Pseudonym) to allow mboxes to
properly identity its requests.
9 IMPLEMENTATION
We present the implementation of MiddlePolice’s prototype in this
section. The source code is publicly available at Github [2].
9.1 The Implementation of mboxes and CHM
The mboxes and the CHM at the victim are implemented based on
the NetFilter Linux Kernel Module, which combined have ∼1500
lines of C code (excluding the capability generation code). The
software stack of our implementation is illustrated in Figure 2.
All inbound traffic from clients to anmbox is subject to the traffic
policing whereas only accepted packets go through the capability-
related processing. Packet dropping due to traffic policing triggers
iTable updates. For each accepted packet, the mbox rewrites its
destination address as the victim’s address to point the packet to
the victim. To carry capabilities, rather than defining a new packet
header, thembox appends the capabilities to the end of the original
data payload, which avoids compatibility problems at intermedi-
ate routers and switches. The CHM is responsible for trimming
these capabilities to deliver the original payload to the victim’s
applications. If the packet filter is deployed, the mbox performs the
IP-in-UDP encapsulation, and uses the UDP source and destination
port number to carry an authenticator. All checksums need to be
recomputed after packet manipulation to ensure correctness. ECN
and encapsulation interactions are addressed in [14].
To avoid packet fragmentation due to the additional 68 bytes
added by the mbox (20 bytes for outer IP header, 8 bytes for the
outer UDP header, and 40 bytes reserved for a capability), thembox
needs to be a priori aware of the MTUMd on its path to the victim.
Then the mbox sets its MSS to no more thanMd−68−40 (the MSS
is 40 less than the MTU). We do not directly set the MTU of the
mbox’s NIC to rely on the path MTU discovery to find the right
packet size because some ISPs may block ICMP packets. On our
testbed,Md = 1500, so we set the mbox’s MSS to 1360.
Upon receiving packets from upstream mboxes, the CHM strips
their outer IP/UDP headers and trims the capabilities. To return
these capabilities, the CHM piggybacks capabilities to the payload
of ACK packets. To ensure that a capability is returned to the mbox
issuing the capability even if the Internet path is asymmetric, the
CHM performs IP-in-IP encapsulation to tunnel the ACK packets
to the rightmbox. We allow one ACK packet to carry multiple capa-
bilities since the victim may generate cumulative ACKs rather than
per-packet ACKs. Further, the CHM tries to pack more capabilities
in one ACK packet to reduce the capability feedback latency at
the CHM. The number of capabilities carried in one ACK packet is
stored in the TCP option (the 4-bit res1 option). Thus, the CHM
can append up to 15 capabilities in one ACK packet if the packet
has enough space and the CHM has buffered enough capabilities.
Upon receiving an ACK packet from the CHM, the mbox strips
the outer IP header and trims the capability feedback (if any) at
the packet footer. Further, the mbox needs to rewrite the ACK
packet’s source address back to its own address, since the client’s
TCP connection is expecting to communicate with thembox. Based
on the received capability feedback, the mbox updates the iTable
and cTable accordingly to support the traffic policing algorithm.
9.2 Capability Generation
We use the AES-128 based CBC-MAC, based on the Intel AES-NI
library, to compute MACs, due to its fast speed and availability
in modern CPUs [7, 24]. We port the capability implementation
(∼400 lines of C code) into the mbox and CHM kernel module. The
mbox needs to perform both capability generation and verification
whereas the CHM performs only verification.
10 EVALUATION
10.1 The Internet Experiments
This section studies the path length and latency inflation for rerout-
ing clients’ traffic to mboxes hosted in the cloud.
10.1.1 Path Inflation
We construct the AS level Internet topology based on the CAIDAAS
relationships dataset [6], including 52680 ASes and their business
relationships [17]. To construct the communication route, two con-
straints are applied based on the routes export policies in [20, 23].
First, an AS prefers customer links over peer links and peer links
over provider links. Second, a path is valid only if each AS providing
transit is paid. Among all valid paths, an AS prefers the path with
least AS hops (a random tie breaker is applied if necessary). As an
example, we use Amazon EC2 as the cloud provider to host the
mboxes, and obtain its AS number based on the report [3]. Ama-
zon claims 11 ASes in the report. We first exclude the ASes not
appearing in the global routing table, and find that AS 16509 is the
provider for the remaining Amazon ASes, so we use AS 16509 to
represent Amazon.
We randomly pick 2000 ASes as victims, and for each victim we
randomly pick 1500 access ASes. Among all victims, 1000 victims are
stub ASes without direct customers and the remaining victims are
non-stub ASes. For each AS-victim pair, we obtain the direct route
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Victims N hopinfla P
short
cut P
no
infla
Non-stub ASes 1.1 10.6% 22.2%
Stub ASes 1.5 8.4% 18.0%
Overall 1.3 9.5% 20.1%
Table 3: Rerouting traffic tomboxes causes small AS-hop in-
flation, and ∼10% access ASes can even reach the victim with
fewer hops throughmboxes.
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Figure 3: [Internet] FCTs for direct paths and rerouted paths
under various Internet conditions.
from the access AS to the victim, and the rerouted path through
an mbox. Table 3 summarizes the route comparison. N hopinfla is the
average AS-hop inflation of the rerouted path compared with the
direct route. P shortcut is the percentage of access ASes that can reach
the victim with fewer hops after rerouting and Pnoinfla is percentage
of ASes without hop inflation.
Overall, it takes an access AS 1.3 more AS-hops to reach the
victim after rerouting. Even for stub victims, which are closer the
Internet edge, the average hop inflation is only 1.5. We also notice
that ∼10% ASes have shorter paths due to the rerouting.
Besides EC2, we also perform path inflation analysis whenmboxes
are hosted by CloudFlare. The results show that the average path
inflation is about 2.3 AS-hops. For any cloud provider, MiddlePo-
lice has the same path inflation as the cloud-based DDoS solutions
hosted by the same cloud provider, since capability feedback is car-
ried in ACK packets. As such, deploying MiddlePolice into existing
cloud-based systems does not increase path inflation.
10.1.2 Latency Inflation
In this section, we study the latency inflation caused by the rerout-
ing. In our prototype running on the Internet, we deploy 3 mboxes
on Amazon EC2 (located in North America, Asia and Europe), one
victim server in a US university and about one hundred senders
(located in North America, Asia and Europe) on PlanetLab [1] nodes.
We also deploy few clients on personal computers to test Middle-
Police in home network. The wide distribution of clients allows
us to evaluate MiddlePolice on various Internet links. We did not
launch DDoS attacks over the Internet, which raises ethical and
legal concerns. Instead, we evaluate how MiddlePolice may affect
the clients in the normal Internet without attacks, and perform
the experiments involving large scale DDoS attacks on our private
testbed and in simulation.
mbox ISP Victim
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Figure 4: Testbed network topology.
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Figure 5: [Testbed] Throughput and goodput when Middle-
Police policies different numbers of senders.
In the experiment, each client posts a 100KB file to the server, and
its traffic is rerouted to the nearestmbox before reaching the server.
We repeat the posting on each client 10,000 times to reduce sampling
error. We also run the experiment during both peak hours and
midnight (based on the server’s timezone) to test various network
conditions. As a control, clients post the files to server via direct
paths without traversing though mboxes.
Figure 3 shows the CDF of the flow completion times (FCTs) for
the file posting. Overall, we notice ∼9% average FCT inflation, and
less than 5% latency inflation in home network. Therefore, traffic
rerouting introduces small extra latency to the clients.
MiddlePolice’s latency inflation includes both rerouting-induced
networking latency and capability-induced computational over-
head. As evaluated in § 10.2.1, the per-packet processing latency
overhead caused by capability computation is ∼1.4 µs, which is
negligible compared with typical Internet RTTs. Thus, MiddlePo-
lice has latency almost identical to the existing cloud-based DDoS
mitigation service.
10.2 Testbed Experiments
10.2.1 Traffic Policing Overhead
In this section, we evaluate the traffic policing overhead on our
testbed. We organize three servers as one sender, onembox and one
receiver. All servers, shipped with a quad-core Intel 2.8GHz CPU,
run the 3.13.0 Linux kernel. The mbox is installed with multiple
Gigabit NICs to connect both the sender and receiver. A long TCP
flow is established between the sender and receiver, via the mbox,
to measure the throughput achieved by the sender and receiver. To
emulate a large number of sources, thembox creates an iTable with
N entries. Each packet from the sender triggers a table look up for
a random entry. We implement a two-level hash table in the kernel
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space to reduce the look up latency. Then the mbox generates a
capability based on the obtained entry.
Figure 5 shows the measured throughput and goodput under
various N . The goodput is computed by subtracting the additional
header and capability size from the total packet size. The baseline
throughput is obtained without MiddlePolice. Overall, the policing
overhead in high speed network is small. When a singlembox deals
with 100,000 sources sending simultaneously, throughput drops by
∼10%. Equivalently, MiddlePolice adds around 1.4 microseconds
latency to each packet processed. By replicating more geographi-
cally distributed mboxes in the cloud, the victim can distribute the
workload across many mboxes when facing large scale attacks.
10.2.2 Enforce Destination-Defined Traffic Control Policies
We now evaluate MiddlePolice’s performance for enforcing victim-
defined traffic control policies, along with the effectiveness of filter-
ing bypassing traffic. This section evaluates pure MiddlePolice. In
reality, once incorporated by existing cloud-based DDoS prevention
vendors, MiddlePolice needs only to process traffic that passes their
pre-deployed defense.
Testbed Topology. Figure 4 illustrates the network topology, in-
cluding a single-homed victim AS purchasing 1Gbps bandwidth
from its ISP, an mbox and 10 access ASes. The ISP is emulated by
a Pronto-3297 48-port Gigabit switch to support packet filtering.
The mbox is deployed on a server with multiple Gigabit NICs, and
each access AS is deployed on a server with a single NIC. We add
100ms latency at the victim via Linux traffic control to emulate
the typical Internet RTT. To emulate large scale attacks, 9 ASes
are compromised. Attackers adopt a hybrid attack profile: 6 attack
ASes directly send large volumes of traffic to the victim, emulating
amplification-based attacks, and the remaining attack ASes route
traffic through the mbox. Thus, the total volume of attack traffic
is 9 times as much as the victim’s bottleneck link capacity. Both
the inbound and outbound points of the mbox are provisioned
with 4Gbps bandwidth to ensure the mbox is not the bottleneck,
emulating that the mbox is hosted by the well-provisioned cloud.
Packet Filtering. We first show the effectiveness of the packet
filter. Six attack ASes spoof the mbox’s source address and send
6Gbps UDP traffic to the victim. The attack ASes scan all possible
UDP port numbers to guess the shared secret. Figure 6 shows the
volume of attack traffic bypassing thembox and its volume received
by the victim. As the chance of a correct guess is very small, the
filter can effectively stop the bypassing traffic from reaching the
victim. Further, even if the shared secret were stolen by attackers at
time ts , the CHM would suddenly receive large numbers of packets
without valid capabilities. Since packets traversing the mbox carry
capabilities, the CHM realizes that the upstream filtering has been
compromised. The victim then re-configures the ACL using a new
secret to recover from key compromise. The ACL is effective within
few milliseconds after reconfiguration. Thus, the packet filtering
mechanism can promptly react to a compromised secret.
NaturalShare and PerASFairshare Policies. In this section, we
first show that MiddlePolice can enforce both NaturalShare and
PerASFairshare policies described in § 6.3.5. We use the default
parameter setting in Table 2, and defer detailed parameter study in
§ 10.3. Since MiddlePolice conditionally allows an AS to send faster
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Figure 6: [Testbed] Packet filtering via ACL.
than itsWR , we use the window size, defined as the larger value
between an AS’s WR and its delivered packets to the victim, as
the performance metric. For clear presentation, we normalize the
window size to the maximum number of 1.5KB packets deliverable
through a 1Gbps link in one detection period. We do not translate
window sizes to throughput because packet sizes vary.
Attackers adopt two representative strategies: (i) they send flat
rates regardless of packet losses, and (ii) they dynamically adjust
their rates based on packet losses (reactive attacks). To launch flat-
rate attacks, the attackers keep sending UDP traffic to the victim.
The CHM uses a dedicated flow to return received capabilities to the
mbox since no ACK packets are generated for UDP traffic. One way
of launching reactive attacks is that the attackers simultaneously
maintain many more TCP flows than the legitimate AS. Such a
many-to-one communication pattern allows the attackers to occupy
almost the entire bottleneck, even through each single flow seems
completely “legitimate”.
The legitimate AS always communicates with the victim via a
long-lived TCP connection.
Figure 7 shows the results for the NaturalShare policy. As the
bottleneck is flooded by attack traffic, the legitimate AS is forced
to enter timeout at the beginning, as illustrated in Figure 7(a). The
attackers’ window sizes are decreasing over time, which can be
explained via Figure 7(b). As the volume of attack traffic is well
above the bottleneck’s capacity, all attack ASes’ LLRs are well above
Thdropslr . Thus, thembox drops all their best-effort packets. As a result,
when one attack AS’s window size isW (t) in detection period t ,
thenW (t + 1) ≤W (t) since in period t+1 any packet sent beyond
W (t) is dropped. Further, any new packet losses from the attack AS,
caused by an overflow at the bottleneck buffer, will further reduce
W (t + 1). Therefore, all attack ASes’ window sizes are consistently
decreasing over time, creating spare bandwidth at the bottleneck
for the legitimate AS. As showed in Figure 7(a), the legitimate AS
gradually recovers from timeouts.
The NaturalShare policy, however, cannot well protect the le-
gitimate AS if the attackers adopt the reactive attack strategy. By
adjusting the sending rates based on packet losses, the attack ASes
can keep their LLRs low enough to regain the advantage of deliv-
ering best-effort packets. Meanwhile, they can gain much more
bandwidth by initiating more TCP flows. Figure 7(c) shows the
window sizes when each attack AS starts 200 TCP flows whereas
the legitimate AS has only one. The attackers consume over 95% of
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Figure 7: [Testbed] Enforcing the NaturalShare policy. The legitimate AS gradually obtains a certain amount of bandwidth
under flat-rate attacks since attackers’ window sizes drop consistently over time (Figure 7(a)) due to their high LLRs (Figure
7(b)). However, the attack ASes can consume over 95% of the bottleneck bandwidth via reactive attacks (Figure 7(c)) while
maintaining low LLRs similar to the legitimate AS’s LLR (Figure 7(d)).
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(a) Window sizes in flat-attacks.
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(c) Window sizes in reactive att.
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Figure 8: [Testbed] Enforcing the PerASFairshare policy. The legitimate AS can obtain at least the per-AS fair rate at the
bottleneck regardless of the attack strategies (Figures 8(a) and 8(c)). Further, the legitimate AS gains slightly more bandwidth
than the attackers under flat-rate attacks as the attack ASes have large LLRs (Figure 8(b)).
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Figure 9: [Testbed] MiddlePolice ensures that the premium
client (AS A) receives consistent bandwidth.
the bottleneck bandwidth, while keeping low LLRs similar to that
of the legitimate AS (Figure 7(d)).
Figure 8 shows the results for the PerASFairshare policy. Fig-
ures 8(a) and 8(c) demonstrate that the legitimate AS receives at
least per-AS fair rate at the bottleneck regardless of the attack
strategies, overcoming the shortcomings of the NaturalShare pol-
icy. Further, under flat-rate attacks, the legitimate AS has slightly
larger window sizes than the attackers since, again, the mbox does
not accept any best-effort packets from the attackers due to their
high LLRs (as showed in Figure 8(b)).
PremiumClientSupport Policy. This section evaluates the Pre-
miumClientSupport policy discussed in § 6.3.5. We consider a le-
gitimate AS (AS A) that is a premium client which reserves half of
the bottleneck bandwidth. Figure 9 plots AS A’s bandwidth when
the number of senders from the attack ASes increases. With the
PremiumClientSupport policy, MiddlePolice ensures AS A receives
consistent bandwidth regardless of the number of senders from
the attack ASes. However, without such a policy, the attack ASes
can selfishly take away the majority of bottleneck bandwidth by
involving more senders. In reality, since an adversary can control
large number of bots, the PremiumClientSupport policy turns out
to be invaluable according to our interviews with industry people.
10.3 Large Scale Evaluation
In this section, we further evaluate MiddlePolice via large scale
simulations on ns-3 [5]. We desire to emulate real-world DDoS
attacks in which up to millions of bots flood a victim. To circumvent
the scalability problem of ns-3 at such a scale, we adopt the same
approach in NetFence [38], i.e., by fixing the number of nodes
(∼5000) and scaling down the link capacity proportionally, we can
simulate attack scenarios where 1 million to 10 million attackers
flood a 40Gbps link. The simulation topology is similar to the testbed
topology, except that all attackers are connected to the mbox.
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(a) NaturalShare.
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(b) PerSenderFairshare.
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(c) Jain’s fairness index (FI).
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 2  4  6  8  10
J
a
in
’s
 f
a
ir
n
e
s
s
 i
n
d
e
x
The number of attackers (million)
Single mbox
10 mboxes
20 mboxes
(d) FI for various mbox counts.
Figure 10: [Simulation] Evaluating NaturalShare & PerSenderFairshare in large scale. Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show that the
clients’ average window size is larger than that of the attackers under both flat-rate and shrew attacks. Figure 10(c) proves
that the clients’ window sizes converge to fairness in the PerSenderFairshare policy. Figure 10(d) shows that MiddlePolice can
enforce strong fairness among all senders even without coordination among themboxes.
Besides the flat-rate attacks and reactive attacks, we also consider
the on-off shrew attacks [33] in the simulations. Both the on-period
and off-period in shrew attacks are 1s. The number of attackers is 10
times larger than that of legitimate clients. In flat-rate attacks and
shrew attacks, the attack traffic volume is 3 times larger than the
capacity of the bottleneck. In reactive attacks, each attacker opens
10 connections, whereas a client has one. The bottleneck router
buffer size is determined based on [10], and the RTT is 100ms.
NaturalShare & PerSenderFairshare in Scale. Figure 10 shows
the results for enforcing NaturalShare and PerSenderFairshare
policies with default parameter settings. We plot the ratio of clients’
average window size to attackers’ average window size for the
NaturalShare policy in Figure 10(a). For flat-rate attacks and shrew
attacks, it may be surprising that the clients’ average window size is
larger than that of the attackers. Detailed trace analysis shows that
it is because that the window sizes of a large portion of attackers
keep decreasing, as we explained in our testbed experiment. As
the number of attackers is much larger than the client count, the
attackers’ average window size turns out to be smaller than that
of the clients, although the absolute volume of attack traffic may
be still higher. Under reactive attacks, the clients’ average window
size (almost zero) is too small to be plotted in Figure 10(a).
Figure 10(b) shows that the clients enjoy even larger window
ratio gains under the PerSenderFairshare policy in flat-rate and
shrew attacks because even more attackers enter the window drop-
ping mode. Further, the PerSenderFairshare ensures that the clients’
average window size is close to the per-sender fair rate in reactive
attacks. Figure 10(c) demonstrates such per-client fairness since
Jain’s fairness index [16] (FI) is close to 1.
mbox Coordination for Co-bottleneck Detection. To enforce
global per-sender fairness, the mboxes sharing the same bottleneck
link share their local observations (§6.3.5). We first investigate
how bad the FI can be without such inter-mbox coordination. We
reconstruct the topology to create multiple mboxes, and map each
client to a randommbox. The attackers launch reactive attacks. The
results, plotted in Figure 10(d), show that the FI drops slightly, by
∼8%, even if 20 mboxes make local rate allocations without any
coordination among them.
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Figure 11: [Simulation] The SLR correlation coefficient re-
flects whether twomboxes share a bottleneck link.
To complete our design, we further propose the following co-
bottleneck detection mechanism. The design rationale is that if
two mboxes’ SLR observations are correlated, they share a bottle-
neck with high probability. To validate this, we rebuild the network
topology to create the scenarios where two mboxes share and do
not share a bottleneck, and study the correlation coefficient of their
SLRs. We compute one coefficient for every 100 SLR measurements
from eachmbox. Figure 11 shows the CDF of the coefficient. Clearly,
the coefficient reflects whether the two mboxes share a bottleneck.
Thus, by continuously observing such correlation between two
mboxes’ SLRs, MiddlePolice can determine with increasing cer-
tainty whether or not they share a bottleneck, and can configure
their coordination accordingly.
Parameter Study. In this section, we evaluate MiddlePolice using
different parameters than the default values in Table 2. We mainly
focus onDp , Thdropslr and β . For each parameter, we vary its value in
experiments to obtain the clients’ average window size under the
10-million bot attack. The results showed in Table 4 are normalized
to the window sizes obtained using default parameters in Table 2.
Under the NaturalShare policy, the shorterDp produces a larger
window size for legitimate clients since each sender’sWR is up-
dated per-period so that a smallerDp causes faster cut in attackers’
window sizes. For Thdropslr , a smaller value slows down the clients’
recovery whereas a larger value allows larger window sizes for at-
tackers. Both will reduce the clients’ share. A larger β has negative
effects as it takes more time for the clients to recover to a low LLR.
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(a) The NaturalShare Policy
Dp Thdropslr β
2s 8s 0.03 0.1 0.5 0.9
Flat 1.1 0.17 0.78 0.39 1.1 0.78
Shrew 1.3 0.65 0.77 1.0 1.2 0.80
(b) The PerSenderFairshare Policy
Dp Thdropslr β
2s 8s 0.03 0.1 0.5 0.9
Flat 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.69 0.85 0.81
Shrew 1.1 0.98 0.72 0.83 1.0 0.98
Reactive 1.0 0.99 1.0 0.94 1.0 1.0
Table 4: [Simulation]Clients’ averagewindow size under dif-
ferent parameter settings.
With the PerSenderFairshare policy, MiddlePolice’s performance
is more consistent under different parameter settings. The most
sensitive parameter is Thdropslr because it determines whether one
source can send best-effort traffic.
11 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly discuss previous academic work. Previous
research approaches can be generally categorized into capability-
based approaches (SIFF [55], TVA [56], NetFence [38]), filtering-
based approaches (Traceback [49, 51], AITF [12], Pushback [26, 41],
StopIt [37]), overlay-based approaches (Phalanx [18], SOS [28], May-
day [8]), deployment-friendly approaches (Mirage [42], CRAFT [29]),
approaches based on future Internet architectures (SCION [57],
SIBRA [13], XIA [44], AIP [9]), and others (SpeakUp [54], SDN-
based [19, 50], CDN-based [22]). We summarize the properties of
one or two approaches from each category in Table 5. The com-
parison shows that MiddlePolice requires the least deployment
(no source upgrades, no additional router support and no deploy-
ment from unrelated ASes) while providing the strongest property
(enforcing destination-chosen traffic control policies).
12 DISCUSSION
We briefly cover some aspects that are not previously discussed.
Allowing ISPs to Disrupt the DDoS Prevention Industry. A
prerequisite of using existing DDoS prevention service providers is
that a victim redirect its network traffic to these service providers.
Cloudflare, for instance, will terminate all user SSL connections
to the victim at Cloudflare’s network edge, and then send back
user requests (after applying their secret sauce filtering) to the des-
tination server using new connections. Although this operation
model is acceptable for small websites (i.e., personal blogs), our
industrial interview indicates that it is privacy invasive for large or-
ganizations such as government and hosting companies. Unless the
victim fully trusts its selected cloud infrastructure or builds its own
cloud infrastructure, MiddlePolice has the same privacy concern.
Currently, these large organizations have to rely on their ISPs to
block attack traffic. We leave it to future work on the exploration
of how ISPs may disrupt the DDoS prevention industry.
mboxesMapping.MiddlePolice can leverage the end-user map-
ping [15] to achieve better mbox assignment, such as redirecting
clients to the nearestmbox, mapping clients according to their ASes,
and load balancing.
Incorporating Endhost Defense. MiddlePolice can cooperate
with the DDoS defense mechanism deployed, if any, on the vic-
tim. For instance, via botnet identification [27, 40], the victim can
instruct themboxes to block botnet traffic early at upstream so as to
save more downstream bandwidth for clients. Such benefits are pos-
sible because the traffic control policies enforced by MiddlePolice
are completely destination-driven.
Additional Monetary Cost. As discussed in 10.2.1, MiddlePolice
introduces small computational overhead. Compared with basic
DDoS-as-a-service solutions, MiddlePolice offers additional func-
tionalities such as enabling destination-chosen policies and filtering
bypassing traffic. In a competitive marketplace, service’s price (the
monetary cost) should scale with the cost of providing that service,
which, in the case of MiddlePolice, is low.
Traffic Learning Tools. Through our interviews with industry
people, we notice that some organizations have limited knowledge
about their traffic. Thus, although MiddlePolice is able to enforce
arbitrary victim-selectable traffic control policies, these organiza-
tions would receive limited benefits since they could not figure out
correct policies (e.g., what typical of traffic is most critical to their
business, which clients are more important to their profit). To assist
these organizations to better understand their network traffic and
therefore bring out more rational policies, we are in active research
on inventing multiple machine learning based traffic learning tools,
focusing on traffic classification and client clustering.
13 CONCLUSION
Guided by our large-scale industrial interviewswith potential DDoS
victims, this paper presents MiddlePolice, the first DDoS mitigation
system that offers readily deployable and proactive DDoS preven-
tion. In its design,MiddlePolice explicitly addresses three challenges.
First, MiddlePolice designs a capability mechanism that requires
only limited deployment from the cloud, rather than widespread
Internet upgrades. Second, MiddlePolice is fully destination-driven,
addressing the shortcomings of the existing DDoS prevention sys-
tems that can only work either protocol or vendor defined traffic
control policies. Finally, MiddlePolice addresses the traffic-bypass
vulnerability of the existing cloud-based solutions. Extensive eval-
uations on the Internet, testbed and large scale simulations val-
idate MiddlePolice’s deployability and effectiveness in enforcing
detestation-chosen traffic control policies. Besides the technical con-
tribution, based our large-scale survey, we also articulated the de-
sign space of future advanced DDoS prevention mechanism, though
which we hope to offer more insight into practical DDoS mitigation
in research community.
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Pushback[41] SIFF[55], TVA[56] Netfence[38] Phalanx[18] Mirage[42] SIBRA[13] MiddlePolice
Source upgrades No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Dest. upgrades No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AS deployment Remote and Unrelated Remote and Unrelated Remote and Unrelated Remote and Unrelated Related Unrelated Related
Router support O(N ) states Cryptography;
O(N ) states for [56]
O(N ) states;
Cryptography O(N ) states
Larger
memory None None
Traffic control
policies None None
Per-sender
fairness None
Per-compute
fairness
Per-AS
fairness
Victim-defined
policies
Other
requirements None New header
New header;
Passport[36] New header
Puzzle;
IPv6 upgrade
Redesign
the Internet None
Table 5: Property comparison with other research proposals. “O(N ) states” means that the number of states maintained by a
router increases with the number of attackers. “Cryptography” means that a router needs to support cryptography operation,
e.g.,MAC computation. “Puzzle” means that the mechanism requires computational puzzle distribution.
and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official
policies or endorsements, either express or implied, of NSF, the
University of Illinois, or the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.
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